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Drilling Imposed After the Deep water
Horizon Accident?
Steven Shavell 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1995 (2011)
In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon accident and the
BP oil spill, the government imposed a moratorium on deepwater oil
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. The issue addressed here is whether,
on grounds of policy, BP should be held responsible for moratorium-
related economic losses. The answer that is developed is no. The
reason, in essence, is that, although the spill caused the moratorium,
the moratorium might be viewed as a socially beneficial event on net
because its purpose was to avert a significant danger.
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On April 20, 2010, a catastrophic explosion and fire occurred
aboard an oil-drilling platform, the Deepwater Horizon, which was
leased by BP and stationed approximately fifty miles off the coast of
Louisiana, where the ocean depth is nearly five thousand feet.1 The
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Deepwater Horizon accident resulted in the largest oil spill in
American history.2 Stating his concern about the dangers of future oil
spills from deepwater drilling, President Obama announced a wide-
ranging moratorium on this practice on May 27, 2010.3 As will be
described, the moratorium has had significant economic repercussions
for the Gulf states.
Because the Deepwater Horizon spill ("the BP spill") led to the
moratorium and to economic losses, the question arises whether, as a
matter of policy, BP (and possibly other firms involved in the spill)
should pay for these losses. The Obama Administration apparently
believes that the answer to this question is yes. Former White House
Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said that "the moratorium is a result of
the accident that BP caused" and therefore that demands by
deepwater-drilling rig workers for lost wages "are claims that BP
should pay."4 The answer to the policy question is also of interest
because legal arguments exist that could, in principle, result in BP
owing damages for some moratorium-related losses. However, BP
asserted that it faces no legal obligation to compensate parties for
moratorium-caused losses. When BP reached an agreement with
President Obama to establish a $20 billion fund to compensate victims
of spill-related losses, it claimed that it was not legally responsible for
moratorium-associated losses.5 And when BP agreed to contribute to a
separate $100 million fund to compensate drilling rig workers for
moratorium-related wage losses, it averred that it was doing so only
as a voluntary act.6
The main point developed here is that it is undesirable on
grounds of social policy 7 to hold BP responsible for moratorium-related
losses. The nub of the argument is readily summarized. Although BP
may be said to have caused the moratorium-I assume that had the
spill not occurred, there would have been no moratorium-the
Robertson, 11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes off Louisiana,; 17 Are Hurt, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2010, at A13.
2. Leslie Kaufman, Gulf Studies Yield More Than Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, at
Di.
3. Bruce Alpert & Rebecca Mowbray, Obama Suspends Drilling at 33 Wells; Halt Allows
Time for Deepwater Safety Study, TIMFS-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 28, 2010, at Al.
4. Press Briefing, Robert Gibbs, Press Sec'y, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House
(June 9, 2010), available at httpJ/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/press-briefing-press-
secretary-robert-gibbs-6910.
5. Scott Wilson & Joel Achenbach, BP Agrees to $20 Billion Fund for Gulf Claims, WASH.
POST, June 17, 2010, at Al.
6. Id.
7. By social policy, I refer mainly to the two standard instrumental objectives of tort law.
deterrence of risky behavior, and compensation of victims of harm. I focus on the deterrence
objective, see infra Part III, but also comment on the compensation objective. See infra Part IV.
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moratorium might be viewed as socially beneficial. In particular, the
stated justification for the moratorium was that it would reduce the
danger of additional oil spills, a danger that seemed more serious in
light of the BP spill. If this risk-reduction benefit from the moratorium
outweighed the moratorium-related losses, then the moratorium
should be seen as socially desirable on balance. Under that
assumption, there is no affirmative policy basis for holding BP liable
for the moratorium-associated losses. Moreover, holding a party liable
for causing a socially desirable outcome that arises as a byproduct of
an accident could have a socially perverse effect. Notably, it could
depress incentives to engage in activities, such as oil drilling, that are
socially good on average, even though they sometimes result in
accidents.
Suppose, though, that the moratorium was ill-advised because
its benefit was less than the loss it engendered. Under this alternative
assumption, the conclusion is the same: BP should not be liable for
moratorium losses. But the reason is different-namely, to motivate
the government not to err in declaring moratoriums.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I describes the
moratorium on oil drilling and its economic importance. Part II
addresses the possible liability of BP for moratorium-related losses.
Part III develops the basic policy argument of the Article. Part IV
discusses and interprets the policy argument and then concludes.
I. THE MORATORIUM ON OIL DRILLING
As noted, the Obama Administration announced a moratorium
on deepwater drilling following the accident at the Deepwater Horizon
platform and the realization that oil was escaping at an extraordinary
rate from the wellhead into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
Specifically, after President Obama's declaration of a moratorium,
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar issued an order, on May 30,
2010, halting drilling operations on new deepwater wells and stopping
consideration of permits for deepwater wells for a period of six months
(although he allowed production on existing deepwater wells to
continue).8 However, a supplier of services to offshore oil- and gas-
8. See Press Release, U.S. Dept of the Interior, Interior Issues Directive to Guide Safe,
Six-Month Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling (May 30, 2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Issues-Directive-to-Guide-Safe-Six-Month-
Moratorium-on-DeepwaterDrilingcfm (describing Secretary Salazar's order). This moratorium
was actually a broadening of an earlier moratorium that applied only to the granting of certain
new permits for drilling. See Peter Baker, Obama Extends Moratorium; Agency Chief Resigns,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, http:f/www.nytimes.coni2010/05/28/us/28dril.html (characterizing
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drilling operators successfully challenged the legality of the
moratorium in federal court. On June 22, 2010, U.S. District Judge
Martin L.C. Feldman granted a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the moratorium.9 Judge Feldman based his decision on
the view that the government failed to offer specific evidence of the
need for the general moratorium and that the moratorium would
result in irreparable economic harm to the plaintiffs and to the Gulf
state economies. 10 After Judge Feldman rejected the moratorium,
Secretary Salazar changed the moratorium's terms. On July 12, 2010,
he announced a revised, and in some respects slightly less general,
order permitting drilling to continue on specific deepwater wells,
provided that the drillers adhered to adjusted and more rigorous
safety rules.11 On October 12, 2010, the Administration ended the
revised moratorium, allowing drilling at all new wells, but subject to
enhanced safety rules.12
The purpose of the moratorium was to prevent accidents from
deepwater drilling until the risks of these operations could be better
assessed and the appropriate steps to remedy them could be identified
and undertaken. I3 The government presumably viewed the BP spill as
the earlier moratorium as a limit on permits for new wells only, not on further work on existing
drilling sites).
9. Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (E.D. La. 2010).
10. Id. at 637-39.
11. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, Q's AND A'S: NEW DEEPWATER DRILLING SUSPENSIONS 3-4
(2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile
&PageID=38349 (stating in Q5 that DOI would permit new drilling only under certain restrictive
conditions and in Q6 that it would allow only twelve of thirty-three new deepwater sites where
drilling was ongoing on May 28, 2010, to continue operations); Press Release, Dep't of the
Interior, Secretary Salazar Issues New Suspensions to Guide Safe Pause on Deepwater Drilling
(July 12, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Issues-New-
Suspensions-to-Guide-Safe-Pause-on-Deepwater-Drilling.cfm; see also John M. Broder, U.S.
Revises Rules for Drilling Ban, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at A15.
12. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, Salazar: Deepwater Drilling May Resume for
Operators Who Clear Higher Bar for Safety, Environmental Protection (Oct. 12, 2010), available
at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Deepwater-Drilling-May-Resume-for-
Operators-Who-Clear-Higher-Bar-for-Safety-Environmental-Protection.cfm; see also Peter Baker
& John M. Broder, U.S. Lifts the Ban on Deep Drilling With New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2010, at Al.
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, supra note 8 ('The six month moratorium
on deepwater drilling will provide time to implement new safety requirements and to allow the
Presidential Commission to complete its work ... Deepwater production from the Gulf of Mexico
will continue subject to close oversight and safety requirements, but deepwater drilling
operations must safely come to a halt. With the BP oil spill still growing in the Gulf, and
investigations and reviews still underway, a six month pause in drilling is needed, appropriate,
and prudent." (quoting Secretary Salazar)); see also DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INCREASED SAFETY
MEASURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizonfloader.cfm?csModule=securitygetfile&PagelD=33598
("The Secretary recommends a series of steps immediately to improve the safety of offshore oil
and gas drilling operations in Federal waters and a moratorium on certain permitting and
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constituting important new information about the risks of drilling.
The BP spill dramatically demonstrated that serious accidents could
occur in deepwater operations and that drilling wells at great depths
compromised the oil industry's ability to staunch a spill.
The moratorium resulted in substantial economic losses. They
included forgone profits of owners of deepwater wells and forgone
wages of rig workers and other employees of the deepwater oil
industry. The moratorium also caused losses for owners and
employees of firms that provide goods and services to the deepwater
oil industry, such as manufacturers of drilling equipment and
platforms, food and catering services, and ocean transport services.
Local economies and the nation generally suffered additional losses on
account of reduced spending by the first two categories of victims of
economic losses. Further economic losses fell on the government
because it collected less in taxes from businesses and employees, as
well as less in royalties from oil production.
The magnitude of these various types of losses was large. In a
widely cited report, Joseph Mason, a professor at Louisiana State
University, estimated that the moratorium would cause
approximately $2.1 billion in economic losses to the Gulf states,
including approximately $500 million in lost wages.14 Given the
importance of deepwater drilling in the Gulf-sixty-four percent of
active drilling leases in the Gulf are in deep water' 5-it is not
surprising that the economic losses due to the moratorium were
significant.
II. LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MORATORIUM-RELATED LOSSES
Is it possible that BP will have to pay damages for losses
resulting from the moratorium on oil drilling that followed the
Deepwater Horizon accident? The most important source of liability for
oil spills is the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"), which Congress
enacted after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.16 The OPA holds parties
drilling activities until the safety measures can be implemented and further analyses
completed.").
14. JOSEPH R. MASON, THE EcoNOMIc COST OF A MORATORIUM ON OFFSHORE GAS AND OIL
EXPLORATION TO THE GULF REGION (July 2010); see also The Deepwater Drilling Moratorium: A
Second Economic Disaster for Small Businesses?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus. &
Entrepreneurship, 111th Cong. 21 (2010) (statement of Joseph Mason, Chair of Banking, E.J.
Ourso School of Business, Louisiana State University).
15. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 13, at 3.
16. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2720, 2731-2738, 2751-2753, 2761-2762
(2006). State common law and admiralty law also provides for responsibility for economic losses
from oil spills but it is less broad than under the OPA, so I consider only the OPA here. See
generally JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, LIABILITY FOR EcONOMIC LOSS IN CONNECTION WITH TIE
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strictly liable for a number of categories of harm caused by oil spills, 17
including economic losses.18
Although the OPA is not explicit about the principles of
causation that courts should employ in its use, a number of sources-
notably, the legislative history of the OPA, several closely-related
statutes, the common law and admiralty law backgrounds on which
the OPA expands, and some judicial decisions that apply the OPA-
suggest that the OPA authorizes claims for economic losses in two
types of situations. The first is when a party suffered a loss because an
income-earning resource to which the party had rights of use was
physically harmed due to a spill. The second is when a party suffered
a loss because the party was denied access to an income-earning
resource due to a spill.19 Such award of damages is consistent with the
view that, under the OPA, fishermen would be able to obtain
compensation for economic losses if the authorities barred fishing due
to the risk of oil contamination of fish.20
The award of damages for economic losses in the second type of
situation is of particular interest to us because the moratorium-
related losses derived from denial of access to income-earning
resources. The decision in a case brought under the OPA, Sekco
Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, illustrates the award of
damages in the second type of situation.21 In that case, Sekco Energy,
the owner of an oil-drilling platform, obtained damages for lost profits
from the owner of a vessel, the Margaret Chouest. Sekco Energy lost
profits because the government shut down its platform in order to
conduct an investigation of a spill caused by the vessel. Significantly,
the accident that led to the spill did not damage the platform itself.
The moratorium can be analogized to government authorities
barring fishing or preventing Secko Energy from using its drilling
platform. Likewise, the moratorium was a governmental act ostensibly
taken for prudential reasons that denied owners of deepwater drilling
DEEPWATER HORIZON SPILL (2010). Goldberg, a professor at Harvard Law School, wrote this
report at the request of Kenneth Feinberg in his capacity as administrator of the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility, which distributes the twenty-billion-dollar fund established to compensate for
losses resulting from the spill.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)-(b).
18. 33 U.S.C. §2702(b)(2)(E).
19. GOLDBERG, supra note 16, at 25-35, 39-42.
20. Id. at 12, 40 ("C is a commercial fisherman who relies for his business on fisheries in the
Gulf of Mexico. C claims that oil from a spill for which Oil Co. is responsible has polluted the
waters in which he fishes, and that he has been and will be unable to fish for a period of time,
resulting in lost profits.'); id. at 33-34 (stating that the hearings on the OPA suggest that the
intent of legislators was that fishermen be able to collect economic losses if fishing was prevented
by an oil spill).
21. Sekco Energy, Inc. v. MJV Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1015 (E.D. La. 1993).
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platforms and workers on those platforms access to them.
Consequently, it appears that these owners and workers could make a
colorable claim under the OPA for BP to pay for the economic losses
arising from the moratorium.
Of course, BP could make counterarguments to such a claim.
These counterarguments would likely revolve around issues of
proximate causation. Notably, BP might assert that the moratorium
was a risk outside the ambit of those risks that Congress intended the
OPA to address or that the moratorium resulted from a supervening,
discretionary act of the government. To these counterarguments, there
are responses, and I offer no opinion on the probability that claims for
BP to pay for moratorium-related losses would fare well under the
OPA. Rather, I suggest that it is conceivable that a claim for these
losses would succeed.
If a court allowed damages for economic loss under the OPA,
then damages would include lost profits of oil companies that would
have been able to drill in the absence of the moratorium and lost
wages of their employees. However, the economic losses would not be
likely to reflect forgone earnings of local economies on account of lower
spending by the deepwater drilling industry and its employees
because these losses were not the immediate result of any denial of
access to income-earning resources.
I now turn from the law to policy and consider whether there is
a utilitarian basis for holding BP liable for moratorium-related losses.
I argue that there is not. Therefore, if the law is informed by policy,
the courts should not hold BP liable for moratorium-associated losses.
III. THE ECONOMIC POLICY ARGUMENT AGAINST IMPOSITION OF
LIABILITY FOR MORATORIUM-RELATED LOSSES
A. The General Economic Basis for Setting Damages Equal to Harm
Let me begin by reviewing the economic logic supporting the
conclusion that damages under strict liability should equal harm for
the purpose of inducing potential injurers to reduce risk optimally.22 (I
will comment on the other major purpose of tort law, compensation of
victims, in Part IV.) One aspect of risk reduction is motivating
22. I focus on strict liability because the OPA employs strict liability. Under the negligence
rule, it is also socially desirable that damages equal harm for the purpose of inducing potential
injurers to take optimal precautions. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDFS & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 54-122 (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-72 (1987) (describing the economic theory of liability and incentives
summarized here). I comment on the other major purpose of tort law, compensation of victims in
Part IV, infra.
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potential injurers to adopt socially desirable precautions-that is, to
adopt precautions for which the cost is less than the benefit in terms
of risk reduction. For example, suppose a blowout protector at a new
oil well would lower the chance of a $100 million accident from 10% to
5%. Then the blowout protector would yield an expected reduction in
harm of 5% times $100 million, or $5 million. Hence, the blowout
protector would be socially desirable for the driller to obtain if, but
only if, it cost less than $5 million.
It is clear that the driller would purchase the blowout protector
exactly when that action is socially desirable if liability is strict and
damages for a spill equal the harm caused. In these circumstances,
having the blowout protector would save the driller expected liability
expenses of $5 million, implying that the driller would buy the
protector if and only if the protector cost less than $5 million.
Furthermore, if damages are less than the harm from a spill,
the driller might not take a desirable precaution when it ought to; and
if damages exceed the harm from a spill, the driller might take a
precaution when it should not. To illustrate, if damages are $50
million, then the driller would save only 5% of $50 million, or $2.5
million, from having the blowout protector. Thus, if the cost of the
protector fell between $2.5 million and $5 million, the driller would
not purchase the protector even though the purchase would be socially
desirable. Conversely, if damages are $150 million, the driller would
save 5% times $150 million, or $7.5 million, from having the blowout
protector. Therefore, the driller would buy the protector as long as its
cost was less than $7.5 million. Hence, if the cost were between $5
million and $7.5 million, the driller would purchase it even though
that would not be socially desirable.
A second dimension of risk reduction concerns engagement in
risky activities. Society has an interest in motivating parties not to
undertake risky activities unless the benefits obtained from the
activities outweigh their costs, including the accident losses that the
activities generate. Many activities create substantial accident losses
even though injurers take socially desirable precautions when
engaging in them, for such precautions often, if not usually, only
reduce-they do not eliminate-the risk of accidents. In our example,
if the blowout protector costs $3 million, then the driller should
purchase it, but there will be a residual risk of five percent of an
accident, resulting in expected harm of $5 million. It would therefore
be best that the drilling go forward only if the net benefit derived from
drilling exceeds the $3 million cost of the blowout protector plus the $5
million in expected harm.
[Vol. 64:6:19952002
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This socially desirable outcome will occur if the injurer faces
strict liability for harm and the damages for an accident equal the
harm of $100 million. In these circumstances, the driller will make the
socially correct decision whether to engage in drilling operations
because the driller would bear an expected liability cost equal to the
expected social cost of $5 million for engaging in its operations.
Additionally, if the level of damages is less than the harm, then
the driller might engage in drilling too much from a social standpoint
and, if the level of damages exceeds harm, the driller might be
undesirably discouraged from drilling. If damages are $50 million, the
expected liability cost of drilling would be $2.5 million, so the driller
would engage in drilling whenever its profits exceed $2.5 million
rather than only when its profits exceed $5 million; and, if damages
are $150 million, the driller would engage in drilling only when its
profits exceed $7.5 million.
B. The Benefits and Costs of a Socially Desirable Moratorium
Now consider a socially desirable moratorium on an activity,
such as oil drilling, declared in the aftermath of an accident.
Specifically, make the following assumptions: First, an accident not
only causes direct harm, but it also generates new information about
the dangers of the activity and added precautions that can be
exercised to lower the dangers at other locations where the activity is
undertaken. Second, this new information implies that a temporary
cessation of the activity would yield social benefits that exceed its
costs because the cessation would allow the precautions to be taken.
To illustrate, suppose that drilling is being undertaken at two
new wells and an accident resulting in an oil spill occurs at the first
well. Before the accident, the government thought that drilling at the
second well was safe but, as a result of the accident, the government
realized that drilling at the second well involves risk which, if not
addressed, will generate an expected harm of $20 million over the next
six months. If, though, the government shuts down the second well for
six months, a period that will allow for additional safety steps to be
taken, the risk will be eliminated. The total cost of the shutdown is $5
million, comprised of lost profits and wages of $3 million and the
expense of safety devices of $2 million. 23 It will be socially desirable for
23. I treat these economic losses as social losses here and elsewhere in this Article.
However, economic losses generally are not equivalent to social losses. For example, the profits
lost by one firm on account of an interruption in its ability to carry on its operations may result
in an increase in the business and profits of another firm, as demand is diverted to this other
firm; hence, the second firm's increase in business mitigates the social loss caused by the first
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the government to shut the second well down for six months, as this
saves society $20 million minus $5 million, or $15 million. 24 Thus, a
six-month moratorium would be socially desirable.
C. Why Damages for an Accident Should Not Include Moratorium-
Caused Losses if the Moratorium is Socially Desirable
Let us next examine the question of what the damages should
be when an accident occurs at the first well that leads to a socially
desirable moratorium on drilling at the second well. Note that under
our assumptions, the accident causes the moratorium in the usual
"but for" sense-the moratorium would not have been declared had
the accident at the first well not occurred, for that accident produced
new information about dangers elsewhere that led to the moratorium.
The total loss due to an accident is the combined effect of the
direct loss from the accident and the moratorium-associated effect of
the accident. The direct effect of the accident at the first well I will
assume to be $100 million, as in the earlier example. The
moratorium-associated effect of the accident at the second well is the
benefit it provides less the loss it generates, which is $15 million.
Hence, the total loss due to the accident at the first well is the $100
million direct loss minus the $15 million net benefit from the
moratorium. This equals $85 million; the amount is less than the $100
million direct loss because on balance the moratorium was a good
thing-the accident was effectively a wake-up call to society that
allowed it to avert expected losses from drilling at a different well.
There is no paradox in the calculation that the harm from the accident
is less than its direct amount of $100 million. If the accident had not
happened, society would not have known that the risk at the second
well was so high and, given the assumptions, society would have
suffered an additional $20 million in expected losses because there
would not have been any moratorium on drilling at that well.
Let us now consider the issue of damages. Should the
moratorium-caused economic losses of $3 million be added to the
firm's loss of business. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 135-40; Urs Schweizer, Tortious Acts
Affecting Markets, 27 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 49, 49-65 (2007). It would be distracting for our
purposes, however, to consider the complexities of this issue.
24. I am assuming that total production of oil from the second well will be the same
whether or not there is a moratorium. The only effect of the moratorium is to allow time to
install new safety devices in order to prevent twenty-million dollars in harm, and to generate
economic losses over that period. In a realistic rather than stylized mode], the time value of
money would have to be taken into account, for the moratorium would in part delay the time
pattern of earnings. Consideration of this issue is not needed for our purposes, so I abstract from
it.
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direct accident losses of $100 million? Clearly, the answer is no. The
true total social losses caused by the accident are $85 million. Thus,
normal damages of $100 million are too high; making them higher
still, equal to $103 million, would only exacerbate the problem of
excessive damages. Therefore, according to conventional economic
deterrence arguments, we arrive at an unambiguous conclusion:
damages should not be augmented by the economic losses caused by a
socially desirable moratorium. Imposing excessive damages, such as
$103 million, could lead in general to the undesirable consequences I
noted above, namely to the taking of precautions that cost more than
they are worth to society and to the discouragement of participation in
socially desirable activities.
Indeed, in principle, damages should be reduced from $100
million to $85 million. This could be achieved by giving the party
liable for the accident at the first well a net credit of $15 million
against its conventional damages of $100 million. Although this is the
theoretically correct result, I do not suggest that damages in fact be
computed in this way, as I explain in Part IV.
D. Why Damages Should Not Include Moratorium-Caused Losses if the
Moratorium is Socially Undesirable
Suppose that the government declares a moratorium after an
accident but the moratorium is socially undesirable because its benefit
is less than its cost. For example, consider the following modification
to the moratorium example: a cessation of drilling at the second well
would prevent expected losses of only $10 million, but it would involve
economic losses of $20 million and expenses for safety devices of $5
million. Then the moratorium would create a net loss of $25 million
minus $10 million, or $15 million (rather than the net benefit of $15
million in the original example of the moratorium).
Under this assumption, what should damages be for the firm
that caused the accident at the first well, leading to the moratorium?
It might seem that $15 million should be added to the direct losses of
$100 million since the total losses caused by the accident include the
$15 million of net social harm due to the moratorium.
However, imposing damages for moratorium losses might
perversely affect the government's incentives to declare ill-advised
moratoriums. If courts award damages for moratorium-related
economic losses, then the government will tend to hear fewer
complaints from those who suffer economic losses on account of a
moratorium because damage payments will compensate the victims of
these economic losses. The government may therefore be more often
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tempted for political reasons (notably, to appear to address the
problem caused by a dramatic adverse event, such as the Deepwater
Horizon accident) to declare moratoriums that are not in the true
public interest. Consequently, it may be best for courts not to award
damages for economic losses when a moratorium is socially
undesirable.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Part, I want to comment on the foregoing analysis and
some of the assumptions underlying it, and then conclude.
First, the main point of the analysis-that adding moratorium
losses to normal damages is unsound from a policy perspective-can
be better appreciated by considering a hypothetical example. Suppose
that before engaging in any deepwater operations in the Gulf of
Mexico, an oil company, "Oilco," drilled a test well to ascertain the
dangers of deepwater operations. Suppose too that Oilco discovered-
but without causing a spill-that the risks of these operations were
significantly higher than anticipated, calling for use of enhanced
safety practices there and at other deepwater sites. Suppose also that,
as a result of this information, President Obama declared a
moratorium to prevent excessively risky deepwater drilling by oil
companies in the Gulf until new safety steps were undertaken. Under
this counterfactual scenario, the reader would presumably agree that
imposing damages on Oilco for economic losses due to the moratorium
would not be sensible: Oilco did not cause a spill; all it did was develop
useful information that saved society from experiencing future harm
from deepwater drilling. To impose liability in these circumstances
would not only serve no positive purpose, it could have undesirable
consequences, including a perverse chilling effect on drilling test wells.
Oilco might not have drilled its test well to gauge danger if it thought
that could lead to a large moratorium-related liability. This example is
revealing because it isolates the effect of new information about
danger as the cause of a moratorium. That the actual BP event
resulted both in a spill and in the development of information
engendering the moratorium is, I suspect, what fosters a misleading
intuition held by some that the moratorium-related losses should be
paid by BP.
It may also be useful to observe that in contexts other than the
BP oil spill, firms engage in activities that occasionally produce
information leading to government actions that impose losses on other
parties, yet no one contemplates imposing liability on the firms for
this reason. Consider the problems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
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power plant after the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami that
struck northeastern Japan.25 The disaster resulted in delays in plans
to build more nuclear power plants in Japan and in other countries, 26
but no one suggests that the plant owner, Tokyo Electric Power
Company, should be liable for the lost wages of construction workers
or other losses associated with these delays in nuclear power plant
construction. Similarly, consider the accident in which part of the
fuselage of a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 aircraft blew off during a
flight on April 1, 2011.27 This incident led the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") to call for airlines to inspect certain Boeing
737 aircraft for metal fatigue.28 Again, I am aware of no calls to hold
Southwest Airlines responsible for the losses due to the FAA-
mandated inspections.
Second, according to the analysis, BP's damages should, in
principle, be reduced if the moratorium was socially desirable, yet I do
not suggest that this necessarily be done in practice. The chief reason
is difficulty in estimating the risk-reduction benefits of the
moratorium. That would require an unusually complex inquiry, as it
would involve predicting the likelihood and magnitude of spills from
both existing new wells and planned wells in the event that the
moratorium had not been declared. In contrast, excluding the
economic losses due to the moratorium from damages requires no such
inquiry.
Third, I considered in the analysis both the possibility of a
desirable and of an undesirable moratorium and found that under
each possibility BP should not pay for economic losses due to the
moratorium. Nevertheless, one may ask whether the moratorium
declared after the BP spill began was well-advised. It is not easy to
come to a judgment about this question. Although we have some idea
25. See Martin Fackler, Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, at Al; Martin Fackler & Mark McDonald, Death Toll Estimate in Japan
Soars as Relief Efforts Intensify, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2011, httpJ/www.nytimes.comI201l
/03/14/world/asial14japan.html.
26. See Jo Becker & William J. Broad, New Doubts About Turning Plutonium Into a Fuel,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/11/us/llmox.html; Judy Dempsey,
Panel Urges Germany to Close Nuclear Plants By 2021, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2011, at B7; Andrew
Pollack, Japan's Nuclear Future in the Balance, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/05/10/business/energy-environmentl0yen.html; Kosuke Takahashi,
Fukushima marks a 'Nuclear Ice Age, ASIA TIMES ONUINE, Apr. 5, 2011, http://www.
atimes.com/atimes/Japan/MD05DhOl.html.
27. See Elizabeth A. Harris, After Scare, Southwest Grounds Planes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2011, at A19.
28. See Jad Mouawad & Christopher Drew, More 737 Cracks Found; U.S. Seeks Inspections,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at Al.
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of the economic costs of the moratorium, I am aware of no estimates of
its value in reducing risk.
Fourth, I have considered only the deterrence-related goal of
tort liability, not its compensatory goal. In this regard, an important
general consideration is that the tort system is a very expensive
means of accomplishing compensation. On average, it appears to cost
more than a dollar to deliver each dollar of compensation to a victim
through the medium of the tort system (this average being computed
over both settled and adjudicated cases); the tort system can be
likened to an ATM that imposes a service charge of over a dollar for
each dollar that is withdrawn.29 The costly nature of the tort system
relative to other ways of insuring victims of loss, including
government-provided insurance or disaster relief, implies that from an
economic policy perspective, the tort system cannot be justified solely
as a method of assuring compensation to victims of loss.
In light of the arguments that I have advanced showing that
the imposition of liability for moratorium-related economic losses does
not achieve the deterrence objective of tort law, and the observation
that the tort system should not be employed purely as a means of
compensation, I conclude that there is no clear policy warrant for BP
to pay for these losses.
29. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin reports in a nationwide survey of the tort system that victims
receive only $0.46 of every dollar paid by defendants. TILUNGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT
COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 17 (2003) (stating that victims receive $0.22 of the tort cost dollar for
economic losses and $0.24 for noneconomic losses); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L REV. 1437, 1469-70 (2010).
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